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Abstract
This literature review provides a comparative analysis of the four main approaches within the
status paradigm (social-psychological, rationalist, constructivist, and social immobility) to
determine their respective strengths, limitations, explanatory power, and scope conditions. While
there are various elements of ‘status’ that the approaches converge upon, they diverge significantly
in their understanding of the motivations and strategies adopted by status-seeking states, how
status is a form of power that translates into deference, and whether status-based analyses can be
applied beyond rising and established great powers. The review provides five case studies (China,
Norway, United States, the UNSC, and Russia) to demonstrate not only whether the strategies
advocated by the approaches can accurately explain the status-seeking behaviour of these states,
but also to determine if the approach is generalizable beyond its stated scope. Ultimately, it argues
that to develop the strongest explanation for status-seeking behaviour, it is necessary to build
synthetic accounts that combine insights from multiple approaches. To demonstrate the utility of
synthetic explanations, the review provides an argument in favour of synthesizing the socialpsychological and status immobility approaches.

Keywords: Status, status-seeking, state behavior, soft and hard power, legitimate power, foreign
policy, domestic politics, social psychology, Social Identity Theory, rationalism, constructivism,
status immobility, social-psychology, material capabilities, revisionism, great power conflict,
China, Russia, Norway, United States, and United Nations Security Council reform.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In international relations (IR) scholarship, status is viewed as an explanatory variable for state
behaviour. It is broadly understood as a state's position within or membership in a status community
based on the possession of collectively valued attributes and resources. The literature currently
identifies four main approaches to status, including the social-psychological approach advanced by
Larson & Shevchenko,1 the rationalist approach advocated by Renshon,2 the constructivist
approach innovated by Murray,3 and the status immobility approach pioneered by Ward.4 Despite
a growth of literature published under the status paradigm, there remains a lack of works that
compare and analyze the four approaches. Therefore, this Major Research Paper (MRP) aims to
comparatively analyze the four approaches to provide clarity concerning their application,
strengths, limitations, and directions for future research.
Specifically, this MRP will analyze and compare the approaches on three crucial research
questions. The first research question asks: Which approach offers the most convincing explanation
for why and how states seek status? Here, it will be argued that a synthesis of the social
psychological and status immobility approaches would offer the most convincing explanation as
to why and how states seek status because it would provide actors with the most strategies to pursue
status while reducing the reliance on conflict initiation and geopolitical competition as means to
achieve status improvements. The second research question asks: Which approach best theorizes
status as a form of power and how it translates into deference? It will ultimately be argued that the
rational instrumental and constructivist approaches offer the most compelling understanding of
status as legitimate power – a form of soft power – that confers legitimacy to high-status states.
1

Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2019).
2
Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
3
Michelle Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019).
4
Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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Under this understanding, status is treated as the mechanism through which soft and hard power
are translated into deference due to the legitimacy that accompanies high status. Finally, it is
necessary to ask: Which approach is the most generalizable across all forms of state-power
categorization? Here, it will be argued that the social psychological approach is the most
generalizable because it possesses the broadest scope, providing states of all power categorizations5
with the most options to pursue status beyond conflict initiation and geopolitical conflict.
Before addressing the research questions, the second chapter of this review provides a
baseline definition of status that all four approaches adhere to, and it demonstrates that there is
consensus within the literature that status is based on collective beliefs, is a positional and club
good, organizes states within hierarchies, and leads to deference from lower-status states. The third
chapter begins with an overview of the four approaches explanations for why and how states seek
status, followed by a case study of China that highlights how each approach can be used to explain
the behaviour of a status-seeking state. The fourth chapter starts with a discussion of how
rationalism and constructivism understand status as a form of soft, legitimate power. It proceeds
by demonstrating that the two approaches best understand how status translates into deference
through the legitimacy that high-status confers to states. The fifth chapter demonstrates that the
approaches can be applied beyond their stated scopes through case studies of Norway, the United
States (US), the UNSC, and Russia. Finally, the sixth chapter furthers an argument in favour of
developing synthesized explanations for status-seeking behaviour.6 To demonstrate the utility of
synthetic approaches, the chapter develops the argument presented in the third chapter in that the
best approach to understanding status would be a synthesis of the status immobility and social
psychological approaches.

5

State power categorizations refer to a state's assignment as a small, middle, regional, great, declining, rising, or hegemonic
power.
6
This argument is made in Steven Ward, “Logics of Stratified Identity Management in World Politics,” International Theory 11,
no. 2 (2019); Elias Gotz, “Status Matters in World Politics,” International Studies Review 23, no. 1 (2021); and Paul K.
MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “The Status of Status in World Politics,” World Politics 73, no. 2 (2021).
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Chapter 2: What is Status?
2.1 Converging Understandings of Status
Although the approaches diverge on several important aspects covered in the proceeding chapters,
there is consensus among the four main approaches on a basic definition of status. Larson et al.
offer the most widely cited definition of status, stating that it is "collective beliefs about a given
state's ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position,
sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout)."7 For Renshon, status is defined as “standing,
or rank, in a status community.”8 Similarly, Ward states that “status refers to an actor’s position
within a social hierarchy,”9 and Murray claims that status is equivalent to legitimate social standing
or recognized identity.10
Beyond a shared definition, the approaches further converge on four central aspects of
status. First, within the literature, hierarchies are “understood broadly as any system through which
actors are organized into vertical relations of super- and subordination.”11 Ward’s definition of
status relates to an actor's position within a social hierarchy, and Larson et al. claim that "status
refers to ranking on a hierarchy."12 Renshon states that status is “an actor’s rank or position in a
hierarchy composed of the group of actors that a state perceives itself to be in competition with.”13
Lastly, Murray argues that “status is by definition an exclusive, hierarchically organized
identity.”14
Second, the approaches hold that status is indisputably based on collective beliefs. For
example, Larson et al. define status as collective beliefs about a state's ranking on valued

7

Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, "Status and World Order," in Status in World Politics, eds.
Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7.
8
Renshon, Fighting for Status, 4 (emphasis in original).
9
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 4.
10
Murray, The Struggle for Recognition, 6.
11
Janice Bially Mattern and Alyse Zarakol, “Hierarchies in World Politics,” International Organization 70, no 3 (2016), 624.
12
Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” 16.
13
Renshon, Fighting for Status, 4.
14
Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations, 15.
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attributes.15 Crucially, ‘valued attributes’ does not strictly refer to material resources, but rather
“the relevance of a given attribute for status recognition is socially defied: attributes matter because
of their symbolic value.”16 Renshon states that “because an actor’s status position is based on the
collective beliefs of their community, states seeking to change their status position must alter
others’ beliefs.”17 Murray argues that “who or what a state becomes is the outcome of many
intersecting and overlapping sequences of action and response, where through its social interactions
with other actors a state’s identity is contested, made and reproduced.”18 Lastly, Ward states that
status is produced and sustained by “generating intersubjective bases for social comparisons
between actors.”19 No matter the approach, collective beliefs determine an actor’s status. As a
result, the only way a state can improve its status is if it changes the relevant status community’s
beliefs about it.20
Third, the authors agree that status can be both a positional and club good. Status conceived
as a club good implies membership in a specific group. For example, a substate group can become
a sovereign state without reducing the value of statehood for existing members of the 'sovereignty
club.' Larson et al. argue, however, that "status politics does not stop with membership in a given
club, for there are less formalized positional rankings within clubs that become particularly salient
when they imply some form of primacy, leadership, or 'number one' status."21 While states seek
membership to a certain club, competition over status does not halt once they have been admitted,
as there will be 'jockeying for position' within the club. Status as positional means that it is a
socially scarce resource in that “one group’s status can improve only if another’s declines,”22

15

Larson et al., “Status and World Order.”
Marina G. Duque, "Recognizing international status: a relational approach," International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2018),
580-81.
17
Renshon, Fighting for Status, 24.
18
Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations, 42-43.
19
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 13.
20
William C. Wohlforth, Benjamin De Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and Iver B. Neumann, "Moral authority and status in
International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking," Review of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2018),
527.
21
Larson et al., “Status in World Politics,” 10
22
Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status, 12.
16
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referring to a state’s position within a hierarchy. Status is thus best understood as membership in
(club good) and position within (positional good) a status community.
Finally, regarding the expected outcomes of status-seeking behaviour, there is a consensus
that higher status states expect lower status states to defer to them. The authors claim that high
status inspires voluntary deference from lower-status states to the former's interests and concerns,
including respect for spheres of influence, security, institutions, and prosperity, as well as
intangible goods such as adherence to norms and ideologies.23 Importantly, Renshon claims that
"status contributes to power (in its broader sense) by clarifying who in a given relationship is
expected to defer and to what degree.”24

Chapter 3: Motivations and the Strategy ‘Tool Kit’ of Status Seeking
3.1 Introduction
Despite the convergences noted in the previous chapter, the approaches differ in their
understanding of why states seek status, ranging from intrinsic, instrumental, identity, or obstructed
ambitions-based motivations. More importantly, the approaches hold diverging explanations for
how states pursue increased status, varying from identity management strategies to conflict
initiation, recognitive practices, and logic of rejection. After overviewing how the approaches
understand the motivations and strategies of status-seeking behaviour, this chapter provides a case
study of China to highlight how each approach can be used to explain state behaviour. In the final
section, it will be argued that a synthesis of the social psychological and status immobility
approaches would offer the most convincing explanation as to why and how states seek status.

23
24

Larson & Shevchenko, Quest for Status.
Renshon, Fighting for Status, 42.
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3.2 The Social Psychological Approach
For advocates of the social-psychological approach, the motivational mechanism behind statusseeking is rooted in Social Identity Theory (SIT), which holds that "people want to feel good about
themselves and their group; it is a basic source of self-worth, pride, and overall wellbeing.”25 In
transferring SIT to IR, Larson & Shevchenko argue that states care about their standing in the world
and possess an intrinsic need for self-esteem and to be respected, positively distinct, and
recognized.26 States, like individuals and groups, compare themselves to a reference group that is
equal or slightly higher, and the result of such comparisons determines the state's satisfaction with
its status.27 States are thus motivated to seek status when they are under conditions of status
dissatisfaction – the perception that they are not conferred the status they deserve from their
relevant state-reference group.
The social-psychological approach holds that when a state is status dissatisfied, its leaders
will turn to one of three identity management strategies to improve their relative status.28 The
strategy that a state selects “depends on the group’s beliefs about the permeability of the elite group
as well as the security (stability and legitimacy) of the status hierarchy.”29 When the boundaries of
a higher status group are permeable but the hierarchy is stable, states may utilize a social mobility
strategy, which “emulates the values and practices of the higher status group with the goal of
attaining admission into elite clubs.”30 A social competition strategy may be selected when the elite
group's boundaries are impermeable and the hierarchy is viewed as illegitimate or unstable.
Competition "aims to equal or surpass the dominant group on the value dimension by which its

25

Gotz, “Status Matters in World Politics,” 233.
Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status.
27
Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy," International
Security 34, no. 4 (2010), 71; Henri Tajfel, Henri, John C. Turner, William G. Austin, and Stephen Worchel, “An integrative
theory of intergroup conflict,” Organizational Identity: A Reader 56, no. 65 (1979); John C. Turner and Rupert Brown, “Social
status, cognitive alternatives and intergroup relations.” In Differentiation Between Social Groups, edited by Tajfel, Henri
(London: Academic Press, 1987); and Deborah Welch Larson, "Social identity theory: Status and identity in international
relations,” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (2017).
28
Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status, 5-6.
29
Ibid., 5-6.
30
Larson and Shevchenko, "Status Seekers," 67 (emphasis added).
26
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superior status is measured,”31 typically involving geopolitical competition. Finally, a strategy of
creativity occurs when the boundaries are impermeable, but the hierarchy is stable and legitimate.
Under creativity, states seek to change socially accepted status markers to ones in which the state
excels and could "entail either (1) reevaluating the meaning of a negative characteristic; or (2)
identifying a new dimension on which the lower-status group is superior."32 Although multiple
may appear in a state’s status-seeking policies, one strategy will typically dominate and alter a
state’s foreign policy significantly.33
3.3 The Rationalist Approach
Proponents of the rationalist approach hold that status-seeking is driven overwhelmingly by
instrumental considerations.34 In general, it is believed that the state with the most status in a
particular hierarchy will be the state that governs, receives the greatest amount of deference to its
interests, and sets the rules and institutions of international politics.35 Whether it be a humiliating
event or the belief that one's state is not being attributed the status it deserves, states experience
'status anxiety' or 'status dissatisfaction.'36 Proponents of the rationalist approach argue that “states
are likely to initiate conflicts if there is a gap, or mismatch, between the status a state believes it
deserves and the status that others confer upon it.”37 While this might seem overly deterministic,
one must consider that the most easily interpretable markers of status are material capabilities, most
notably military strength. Thus, if a state is status deficient and the most visible markers of status
are forms of military power, the status deficient state is argued to believe that a demonstration of
military force is necessary to increase its status.

31

Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status, 9.
Ibid., 11.
33
Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers.”
34
Jonathan Renshon, "Status deficits and war," International Organization 70, no. 3 (2016); Ahsan I. Butt, "Why Did the United
States Invade Iraq in 2003?" Security Studies 28, no. 2 (2019); and Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan
G. Baird, Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
35
Allan Dafoe, Johnathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political
Science 17, no. 17 (2014); Yuen Foong Khong, "Power as prestige in world politics," International Affairs 95, no. 1 (2019).
36
Butt, “Why did the United States Invade Iraq in 2003?”
37
Gotz, “Status Matters in World Politics,” 231.
32
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Since status is based on the collective beliefs of the community in which a state belongs,
changing one's status is ultimately concerned with changing other states' beliefs.38 However,
Renshon notes that cognitive limitations reduce the ease of updating other states' beliefs. As a
result, a ‘status altering event’ must be highly visible, dramatic, salient, and convey unambiguous
information.39 Therefore, Renshon concludes that “status dissatisfaction theory predicts that states
are likely to initiate violent military conflicts to shift beliefs about where they stand in a given
hierarchy.”40
3.4 The Constructivist Approach
The constructivist approach holds that status is best conceived as recognized identity claims.41 The
primary motivation behind status-seeking is identity recognition because, as Murray notes,
“recognition gives a state confidence in the value of its particular social identity and provides it
with the ontological security it needs to form a coherent set of interests and act on the basis of those
interests in the world.”42 To be an actor in the international system, states require a stable identity
– “that is, states require ontological security: the need to experience and maintain a continuous
sense of self over time. Ontological security is a prerequisite for agency that enables states to have
confidence in their surroundings and develop means–ends relationships.”43 An absence of
ontological security prevents states from forming coherent interests, having confidence in their
identity, and realizing their traits and abilities.
Since recognition is based on the perceptions and beliefs of other actors, states are argued
to be deeply insecure about their identities as there exists the possibility that their identities will be

38

Renshon operationalizes status communities as regional geographic hierarchies and as 'detected communities,' within which the
internal diplomatic links are more intense and numerous than those with external states.
39
Renshon, Fighting for Status.
40
Ibid., 24.
41
Murray, The Struggle for Recognition; Vincent Pouliot, “Setting Status in Stone: The Negotiation of International Institutional
Privileges,” in Status and World Politics, eds. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014); and Anne L. Clunan, "Historical aspirations and the domestic politics of Russia’s pursuit of
international status," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, no. 3-4 (2014).
42
Murray, The Struggle for Recognition, 191. While other authors such as Pouliot and Clunan write on status within the
constructivist tradition, Murray is the only author who explicitly links ontological security with status-seeking.
43
Ibid., 39 (emphasis in original).
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misrecognized. Under the approach, misrecognition is conceived as a discrepancy between how a
state perceives and constructs its own identity and how others represent and perceive it. In response
to misrecognition, “states resist their social dependence on other states and attempt to take
independent control over the meaning of their identities,”44 even though it is impossible to
independently produce an identity. Two effects emerge from this process. First, states might
achieve recognition from a constructed status community. According to Murray, “successful acts
of recognition provide self-certainty because they transform a state’s self-understanding into its
identity, thereby reflecting back to the state an image of what it already understands that identity
to be.”45 If a state's identity is recognized, it is likely to act as a peaceful status-quo actor, following
the order's norms, rules, and institutions.
However, if recognition is not achieved, a state might increasingly ground its identity in
concrete material practices. Murray claims that “material practices are an effective expression of
an identity because the material world gives substance to the recognition-seeking state’s aspiring
social identity and allows the state to experience its social status as a brute fact, rather than as the
uncertain effect of an ongoing political practice of social construction.”46 By grounding identity in
material practices, the status-seeking state is basing its status claims on pre-existing, recognized
practices of the status community it seeks to join. For Murray, these recognitive practices include
great power voice (increased role in the management of international affairs), exemplary military
power (developing military capabilities that can project power internationally), and spheres of
influence (constructing asymmetrical relations with subordinate states). Together, recognitive
practices produce the illusion that a rising power has achieved an identity independent of
recognition from the established powers.

44

Ibid., 48 (emphasis in original).
Ibid., 49.
46
Ibid., 50.
45
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In response to a rising power's turn to recognitive practices, the established powers likely
continue to deny the rising power's claims, intensifying the disrespect and initiating a process of
securitization that constructs the rising power as an existential threat. According to Murray, "the
ongoing experience of disrespect makes rising powers more confrontational and risk-acceptant in
their foreign policies…and more uncompromising and forceful in asserting that identity on the
international stage.”47 As long as misrecognition persists, the rising power will increasingly resort
to recognitive practices (especially exemplary military power) to prove its status to and compel
recognition from the established powers. The increased bellicosity, willingness to resort to force,
crisis instigation, and growing military strength that accompanies exemplary military power
combine to paint the rising power as a reckless and dangerous entity. The established powers thus
"impute malign motives to the rising power, attributing the mere existence of its power as a credible
signal of its hostile intentions. Put simply, securitization constructs the rising power as
revisionist.”48 This leads to further misrecognition, securitization, and competition between the
states – a cyclical process that Murray refers to as ‘spirals of misrecognition and social
insecurity.’49
3.5 The Status Immobility Approach
For Steven Ward, status immobility offers the most compelling explanation for why states adopt
order-destabilizing revisionist foreign policies. Gilpin's Hegemonic Stability Theory holds that
obstructed demands for incremental changes in the international system incentivize rising states to
demand more significant changes.50 Ward argues that instead of obstructed economic and security
ambitions, it is the obstruction of status ambitions that leads states towards revisionist policies. For
Ward, status concerns increase in salience as a state's material capabilities rise, and they “expect –

47

Ibid., 76-77.
Ibid., 78 (emphasis added).
49
Ibid., 79.
50
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
48
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and demand – convergence in terms of standing, influence, and rights.”51 However, status
recognition often lags considerably behind increases in material capabilities, creating the
conditions for status inconsistency. If the established powers repeatedly deny the rising power's
status claims, elites and other actors within the former likely come to believe that their status
ambitions are incompatible with the status quo order.
Ward terms the perception of status incompatibility as ‘status immobility,’ which “refers to
the belief that a state’s status ambitions face an obstacle that is fundamental to the status quo order
and cannot be overcome from inside of it.”52 As a result, the rising power perceives that its
exclusion from the status club is structurally unjust. Status immobility is essentially a 'status glass
ceiling,' as "the problem is not that the rising state has not yet accumulated the requisite markers
of status and thus does not deserve membership; it is instead that the state does deserve
membership, but other states seem fundamentally unwilling to treat it as a full member of the
club."53 Therefore, states are motivated to seek status when they perceive that they are in a
condition of status immobility, facing obstructed status ambitions from an externally imposed,
unjust order.
Regarding strategy, Ward argues that the social-psychological approach is missing an
account of how states react to an 'unjust, externally imposed, and insuperable obstacle.'54 Ward
builds on the approach by introducing a fourth strategy, ‘the logic of rejection,’ which holds that
“if the rules seem to be fundamentally unfair, then playing the game according to the rules will not
only be futile, it will also reconstitute the rules, the game, and the unjust social hierarchy these
produce. Instead, the condition of status immobility leads to pressure for a response that rejects the

51

Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 39.
Ibid., 42.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid., 49.
52
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status quo order.”55 Thus, the logic of rejection does not aim to achieve higher status in the current
order but instead completely rejects 'playing by the rules' of the order.
Ward argues that for hardliners, status is deeply significant to their self-esteem, and as a
result, conditions of status immobility demand a response. Such a response is argued to be the logic
of rejection because of "the notion that overthrowing or revolutionizing the status quo order might
destroy whatever element of the system is obstructing the satisfaction of the state's status
ambitions."56 The condition of status immobility "makes it harder to legitimate moderate foreign
policies and easier to legitimate aggressive ones, especially policies that seem to reject status quo
norms, rules, and institutions.”57
There are three possible pathways through which leaders respond to status immobility.
First, leaders (either moderate or hardliners) will react to status immobility by producing
rejectionist policies, motivated by the social-psychological consequences of such conditions.
Second, moderate leaders will change course and adopt revisionist policies because sustaining
moderate policies becomes politically impossible. Third, moderate leaders will not change course
when faced with status immobility and are thus replaced through elections, negotiation, or coups
with hardline leaders willing to advance revisionist policies.
Revisionist policies are adopted when actors within the state are either dissatisfied with the
distribution of resources in the international system (territory, power, wealth, markets, influence,
or any ‘valued good) or dissatisfied with the norms, rules, institutions, or relationships – in other
words, the foundation – of the order that influences the distribution of resources and regulates
interaction. These two forms of dissatisfaction influence three different kinds of revisionist foreign
policy. First, a state might be a distributive revisionist through policies that aim to achieve fairer

55

Ibid., 50.
Ibid., 53.
57
Ibid., 56.
56
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material, economic, or social resource distribution.58 Second, states might be normative
revisionists, adopting policies that seek to change the normative foundation of the order. Finally, a
state might combine distributive and normative revisionist policies to become radical revisionists,
which simultaneously aim to satisfy distributive ambitions while rejecting or overthrowing the
foundation of the order.59 While distributive and normative revisionism can lead to conflict and
competition, Ward claims that radical revisionism is the most dangerous, aggressive, and
internationally destabilizing policy orientation. Figure 1 in the Appendix summarizes the four
approaches motivations and strategies.
3.6 China’s Pursuit of Status
Since the 1990s, the literature has considered China the most status-conscious state in the world
due to its rapid and unprecedented economic growth, culture, and increasing military capabilities.
The 'China threat,' 'rise of China,' and hegemonic challenger discourse have only aided in making
China the most important case study for status-based research in the 21st century. The case study
aims to demonstrate the strengths and limitations of the approaches, the most important of which
is whether the strategy advocated by each approach can adequately explain China's behaviour.
3.6.1 The Social Psychological Approach: China’s Strategy of Creativity
The social psychological approach holds that since the 1990s, China has consistently utilized a
strategy of creativity to improve its status.60 China refuses to adopt the predominant Western norms
of individualism, respect for human rights, transparency, democracy promotion, and humanitarian
intervention, adhering instead to traditional norms of sovereignty and nonintervention. In addition,
China rejects neoliberal economic principles set in the Washington Consensus’ one-size fits all

58

Ibid., 10. For Gilpin (War and Change in World Politics), this is referred to as ‘incremental change.’
Ibid., 10.
60
Deborah Welch Larson, “Status Competition among Russia, India, and China in Clubs: A Source of Stalemate or Innovation in
Global Governance,” Contemporary Politics 25, no. 5 (2019); Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status; Hai Yang, "The Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and status-seeking: China’s foray into global economic governance," Chinese Political Science
Review 1, no. 4 (2016); and Yi Edward Yang, “China’s Strategic Narratives in Global Governance Reform Under Xi Jinping,”
The Journal of Contemporary China, no. 128 (2021).
59
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approach, instead adopting the 'Beijing Consensus' wherein 'no strings attached' development
policies are moulded to the specific contexts in which they are applied. These factors contribute to
what Larson & Shevchenko refer to as a 'reframing tactic' of social creativity, "wherein nominally
negative traits (traditional Chinese values which were criticized for obstructing modernization) are
reframed as positive in the post-industrial age."61
In 2014, China announced the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which
specializes in lending for infrastructure development in contrast to the Western-led World Bank’s
focus on poverty alleviation.62 The ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) is another important aspect of
China’s creativity strategy by claiming primacy in a new marker of superior status, infrastructure
construction and connectivity.63 Per Liu, the BRI demonstrates that China is a ‘rule innovator,’ in
that it plays an important role in developing solutions to issues and gaps in the existing order.64
Even on issues such as human rights, China has adopted a creativity strategy, as it is “working to
shift the prevailing international norm from a universal and inalienable human rights standard
based on liberal, democratic values to an alternative standard that gives nation states the right to
balance individual rights against competing national objectives.”65 Through its creative strategy,
China has emerged as the undisputed leader of emerging and developing countries both regionally
and internationally; it has initiated new norms and rules in diplomacy, foreign policy, and global
governance; and promoted a distinctive model of politics and economic development.66
While this case study only covers some of the most important elements of China’s status
quest through social creativity, it demonstrates two crucial aspects of China’s rise. First, “for China,
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Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status, 194.
Larson, “Status Competition Among Russia, India, and China in Clubs,” 557.
63
Larson and Shevchenko, Quest for Status.
64
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the risk that other states might perceive China as a threat, and respond with a policy to contain
China’s rise, motivated elites to seek preeminence in an area other than geopolitical might –
contributing to world order as a responsible power.”67 Since China requires recognition from the
current established powers, it cannot afford to act belligerently, which could result in permanent
status denial. Second, it shows that China still supports the global order because it is not directly
competing with the US for hegemony,68 and, as Liu argues, even though it has become more
confident and assertive, “China often insists on its socialization and commitment to the liberal
global order, which has been an effective way of promoting its peaceful rise and increasing its
reputation and legitimacy.”69 How this strategy will work in the future depends on how the US and
its allies accommodate China and recognize its claims for status. Moreover, with Russia's invasion
of Ukraine in February 2022, China may begin to take more aggressive actions (a strategy of
competition) in its sphere of influence (most importantly, in Taiwan and the South China Sea) as
the response from the West has been perceived as underwhelming and weak.70
3.6.2 The Rational Instrumental Approach: China’s Desire for Recognition
While rationalists recognize that China is the most ‘status-conscious’ country in the world,71 the
US and other great powers have historically been reluctant to accord status to China, denying it a
true sphere of influence by asserting itself in the South China Sea and procuring arms deals with
Taiwan. Furthermore, the 'China threat theories' have attributed to China a "harmful, destabilizing,
and even pernicious international disposition."72 Considering this, why has China not opted for
conflict initiation to improve its status as Renshon's rationalist argument would suggest?
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Of utmost importance to China's reputation is its relationship with the US. As Deng notes,
the US "plays a key role for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership's…opportunities for
upward mobility in world politics. By virtue of its global leadership position, the US decisively
influences the receptivity towards China's rise."73 In other words, the CCP recognizes that the US
has the power to decide who ‘thrives and prospers’ and who is ‘sent to their doom.’74 As a result,
Chinese leaders and analysts have shifted their foreign policy towards moderation and avoided
sustained confrontation with the US to reduce uncertainty and suspicions in response to the China
threat discourse.
In general, China has attempted to downplay its perceived threat reputation by reassuring
the US about its benevolent economic and security aims. Economically, China holds that it is still
largely a developing country and that its massive growth and competitiveness result from
compliance with market principles – 'blame the game, not the player.’ On security, China claims it
ranks lower than other major powers (US and Russia) in terms of comprehensive strength while
spending significantly less than the US on defence. Despite claims of increased Chinese aggression,
the PRC counters by highlighting its peaceful historical record, benevolent Confucian culture, and
promotion of economic cooperation and cooperative security policies. Beginning in the 1990s,
China has equated its foreign policy with the doctrine of ‘peaceful rise,’ global responsibility, and
even restraint on several issues from Taiwan to the South China Sea, nuclear tests, and arms sales.
While China does perceive itself to be in a status deficit, it recognizes that the only way it
can currently achieve status in the international order is by structuring its identity as a cooperative,
peaceful, and responsible actor in international society. Although Renshon does not focus on
alternative foreign policy options to conflict initiation, a complete rationalist perspective must
weigh the relative utility of all available policy options, which is arguably what China has done in
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choosing to achieve major power status through the doctrine of peaceful rise. Even though the
instrumental benefits received from a peaceful rise strategy might be lesser than those of victory in
a hegemonic war, China can still receive important benefits including reduced blockades and
sanctions, reduced counter-balancing efforts, increased resources diverted to economic
development that would have been spent on military capabilities, and even increases in domestic
legitimacy.75 This strategy appears to be paying off, as Thompson notes that other than China, “no
state has been accorded great-power status without a fight of some sort.”76 Since the US and its
great power allies ultimately decide the level of status accorded to China, conflict initiation would
currently be an incredibly risky and potentially counterproductive strategy to improve its status.
Nonetheless, suppose China perceives its attempts at improving status through peace,
responsibility, and cooperation to fail. In that case, the CCP may turn to a more aggressive and
potentially violent strategy to achieve its status ambitions. However, several important
considerations will prevent China from initiating conflict with the US in the immediate future.
First, as Renshon notes, "states target actors they are most likely to defeat [and] also select targets
that are commensurate with them in status ranking.”77 Currently, the US is the closest state to China
regarding capabilities. However, it still possesses a distinct advantage militarily in terms of military
spending and capabilities, especially in terms of international power projection.78 As a result, it is
unlikely that China will initiate conflict with the US under the rational instrumental approach until
China can meet and exceed the military capabilities of the US. Even if they become material equals,
however, the presence of nuclear weapons might eliminate any chance of conflict, as the
consequences would far outweigh any potential instrumental gains. Therefore, it is most likely that
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China will continue to utilize a strategy of peaceful rise, as the instrumental benefits gained –
although less than those received as a hegemon – outweigh the potential annihilation of nuclear
war.79
3.6.3 The Constructivist Approach: A Misrecognized China?
If China seeks equal treatment with the US in an increasingly multipolar world, will its leaders
resort to geopolitical competition and revisionism to achieve its goal? The first thing to consider is
whether China's identity is compatible with that of the established international order. For Murray,
China's understanding of its place in the world is defined by its experiences during the Century of
Humiliation and the resulting narratives of national humiliation and national rejuvenation.80 The
narrative of national humiliation constructs the relationship with the West as one of subordination,
suffering, loss, and humiliation due to Western expansion. Particularly with the United States’ pivot
to Asia, criticisms of China’s human rights record, undermining China’s bid to host the Olympics
in 2000, arms sales with Taiwan, and increased presence in the South China Sea and mainland
Asia, “any attempt by the United States to limit Chinese power is seen as an act of misrecognition
and an unjust and aggressive attempt to subjugate China once again…thus placing the maintenance
of sovereignty at the centre of China’s national identity.”81
On the other hand, the narrative of national rejuvenation is focused on restoring China's
status that was lost during the Century of Humiliation. Under this narrative, China is not seeking
new status but attempting to regain its previous status as a 'great nation.' As a result, Murray claims
that "if China is indeed seeking recognition of its status…then the United States must formulate a
foreign policy that responds accordingly, recognizing China’s place in the international order.”82
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Nonetheless, China recognizes that its cultural differences and understandings of
superpower roles diverge from those of the established powers and order. For example, “China
privileges respect for sovereignty as a central feature of the current international order. Meanwhile,
one of the most salient features of US global leadership since the end of the Cold War has been
interventionism.”83 However, since one of the benefits of belonging to a particular status club is
the ability to choose who enters the club, China understands that it needs recognition from the US
if it hopes to be treated as an equal in the global order. As a result, the rivalry between the US and
China is argued to be symbolic and ideational.
China is not a satisfied power: it prefers a multipolar system as opposed to US unipolarity
and has engaged in limited balancing mostly within its sphere of influence.84 China has adopted
recognitive practices to gain recognition from the US, including economic initiatives like the Belt
and Road and the AIIB (examples of great power voice), developing a blue-water navy (evidence
of exemplary military power), and becoming more assertive in the South China Sea, mainland Asia,
and Africa (maintaining its sphere of influence). However, China does not seek to replace the US
as the hegemonic power; instead, China desires recognition of equal status from the US and other
established powers.
While China does not wish to enter direct conflict with the US, it is also systematically
excluded from the order by virtue of its identity.85 Since China wants to be treated as an equal with
the US, and because the only way for China to demonstrate its alignment with markers of major
power status is through recognitive practices, its attempts at recognition might be misinterpreted.
If China perceives that its identity is consistently misrecognized, it will continue to ground its
identity in exemplary military power, risking elevated confrontation with the US.86 To avoid
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potential conflict and international destabilization, the US must produce and adhere to a foreign
policy that is not based on engagement or containment but on recognizing China's identity and
aspirations for a greater leadership role in the international order.
3.6.4 The Status Immobility Approach: Is China a Revisionist Power?
Despite differences in culture, politics, and ideology, China participates (more or less fully) in the
institutions and maintenance of the international order. Still, there is some uncertainty about
whether China's rise will reinforce or destroy the order. While China has yet to adopt radical
revisionist policies, it has engaged in various bouts of minor revisionism. Distributive revisionism
is evident in China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, its unwavering stance on
sovereignty and Taiwan, and its creation of institutions such as the AIIB. However, China “is a
status quo power, insofar as it benefits more from the existing order than any other state – including
the hegemon.”87 Since China benefits significantly from open markers, American provision of
public goods, and the ability to essentially free-ride and prosper, it makes little sense to drastically
challenge the distributive elements of the current order.88 Normatively, however, China has
actively sought revisions to some of the order's foundational elements. For example, in relations
with other states, China emphasizes a 'logic of relationships' in contrast with the West's 'logic of
transactions,' where it does not use its preponderance of power to benefit asymmetrically, instead
using it for mutual benefit.89 As noted previously, China has begun actively promoting its culturally
relative, illiberal model of national development as an alternative international human rights model
to the West's universalism.90
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China seeks status based on an understanding of membership in the 'legitimate great power
club' where China, the US, and other members have equal standing.91 However, some Chinese
leaders and elites do not perceive that their claims to status have been recognized by the US and
other great powers. Recognition would thus require the US and other great powers to acknowledge
China's position by (1) granting China legitimate authority to act in ways appropriate with great
power standing, (2) avoiding actions that signal to China that it does not possess equal rights as the
other great powers, (3) recognizing China's geographical sphere of influence, and (4) respecting
China's sovereignty by reducing challenges to its human rights record.92
However, the prospects for such status accommodation face three main obstacles. First,
accommodating China might impact the security interests of other great powers, namely the US.
As a result, the US will be faced with a choice: accommodate China and risk security interests or
continue asserting itself in the region and risk signalling status denial. Relatedly, the US must also
account for alliance politics in East Asia and the South China Sea. As Ward notes, the US might
be reluctant to accommodate China’s claims to a sphere of influence due to the reactions of key
allies, such as Japan and South Korea. Third, China’s status claims are arguably incompatible with
the identity of the established great powers. Per Ward, the US supports “a range of values that are
inconsistent with Chinese status claims. American official support, for instance, for human rights
and liberal democracy violate Chinese understandings of what it means to respect sovereignty.”93
Additionally, the US has maintained (or attempted to) an identity as 'exceptional' and
'indispensable,' which does not square well with China's claims to equal rights among the world's
greatest powers. To sum, effective accommodation would require the US to not only make serious
sacrifices to its vital interests and influence but also redefine its role as a superpower in an
increasingly multipolar world.
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Domestically, there is not yet widespread support for policies aimed at rejecting or
overthrowing the order, as Beijing remains committed to caution, stability, and moderation in its
foreign policy initiatives.94 Furthermore, Chinese public opinion is not belligerent, and there are
powerful Chinese groups that have pushed for further integration in the global economy and
moderation in foreign policy.95 However, Ward notes that “the more stridently Western leaders
insist that China must accept and contribute to the evolving international legal regime on issues
such as human rights and collective defense of democracy, the more convinced Chinese leaders
and elites may become that it is impossible to achieve recognition of great power status without
fundamentally undermining the regime.”96 Suppose the US and its allies continue to treat Chinese
attempts at minor normative and distributive revisionism as threats to the international order. In
that case, it is possible that groups like the Nativists, who oppose Chinese participation in the order,
will become more ascendent in foreign policy decision-making. If this were to occur, it is possible
that Chinese leaders would become increasingly attracted to radical revisionist policies that
completely reject the order.
3.7 Discussion
Renshon's rationalist approach offers a strong explanation for the role that status concerns play in
initiating conflicts. However, doing so narrowly restricts the scope of status-seeking options to
conflict initiation. While Renshon does note there are alternative policy options for states to pursue,
he gives the reader no indication as to why status dissatisfied states resort to conflict initiation over
other status-seeking policies, such as building an aircraft carrier, developing new economic or
political norms, or creating new international institutions. In other words, while recognizing that
there are alternatives, Renshon does not elaborate on the relative utility of such options. As Gotz
rightfully points out, "a rationalist perspective needs to rank-order the range of available status-
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seeking policies – and their associated costs and risks – to determine the most cost-effective way
for a state to enhance its international standing in a given situation.”97 As a result, Renshon’s
conceptualization of a rationalist approach contradicts the basic premise of rationalism in that the
author does not say anything about the relative utility of conflict initiation over other means of
gaining status. This limitation makes it difficult to apply Renshon’s framework to the case study of
China, as the state has not engaged in conflict initiation to improve its status.
Furthermore, Renshon does not consider conflict initiation a risky strategy for states to
improve their status in the 21st century. Per Gotz, Renshon does not consider that “the material
costs and risks associated with great power conflict have significantly increased in the last
century.”98 Jervis argues that “unless wars are justified by self-defense or the pursuit of widelyshared goals such as preventing genocide, they now lower rather than raise the country’s status.”99
Lebow claims that “the principal motives responsible for war in the past – standing, security,
revenge, and material interests – are no longer effectively advanced by war in most
circumstances.”100 Perhaps most importantly, nuclear weapons may be the only reason states such
as China and the US do not engage in direct military conflict, even if China eventually catches up
to the US regarding military capabilities. Therefore, the rational instrumental approach might hold
explanatory power concerning states that use conflict initiation to improve their status. Still, the
vast majority of states would benefit greater from alternative strategies that do not require
significant expenditures of blood and treasure.
Murray makes a strong argument concerning revisionist state desires for recognition
through aggressive recognitive practices and other states' responses to such behaviour. However,
her work within the constructivist framework does not offer a developed understanding of the
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interactions between material and social factors.101 Murray claims that traditional wisdom (realism)
is under-socialized in that "status and prestige are reduced to accurate perceptions of a state's
material (and often military) capabilities."102 Somewhat contradictorily, she then argues that
recognition and misrecognition are based on other states' perceptions of a state's material (mostly
military) capabilities. For example, Murray provides case studies of Germany and the US during
the early 20th century in which both nations' growing economic and military might led to similar
status-seeking behaviour, even though they had noticeably different cultural and historical
backgrounds.103 How this occurred, however, is not addressed. Thus, Chavoshi claims that “while
the author identifies the role of social and material factors in states’ construction of self-image as
the only source of self-realization, discussions of the correlation of material and ideational factors
for actors’ identity formation are only marginally covered.”104 As a result, Murray's selfproclaimed social understanding of status is infiltrated by material determinants, making it more
like Renshon’s rationalist approach than Clunan or Pouliot’s constructivist analyses.105
The most significant issue with the social-psychological approach is its application of SIT
to IR.106 Götz notes that individuals operate within hierarchically organized political communities,
whereas states in the international system operate under conditions of anarchy. MacDonald &
Parent argue that SIT is an individual-level theory that measures attitudes toward group
membership and is not an attempt to provide a complete account of relations between groups.107
However, these fundamental aspects of SIT are not addressed in the social psychological
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approach's application of the theory. Thus it is unclear how it can be successfully adapted to the
international level without accounting for these issues.
Second, as Götz states, SIT “presupposes that groups have roughly equal material
capabilities.”108 However, states in the international system possess vastly unequal shares of
material capabilities.109 Incorporating such concerns, Larson & Shevchenko posit that "whether or
not states resort to military conflict to enhance their status depends on the criteria for status within
that context as well as on a state's relative capabilities."110 If SIT presupposes rough equality in
material capabilities, but the international system is inherently unequal, it is conceivable that
material capabilities contribute significantly to a state's status-seeking potential. As a result, the
social-psychological approach is rather ambiguous regarding how unequal international
distribution of material capabilities influences the initiation of status-seeking behaviours.
The most significant issue with Ward's status immobility approach concerns the observation
that while rising powers have many reasons to be more status-conscious, they also have expanding
interests and growing capabilities, leading to equally aggressive behaviour. In each case study
provided, Ward claims that material factors are less important than conditions of status immobility
in explaining state behaviour. However, as Bajpai points out, by the end of each case study, Ward
recognizes that factors other than status immobility play a significant role in explaining a rising
power's behaviours and actions, such as material capabilities or security concerns.111 In other
words, is revisionism the result of status obstructions, or is it the result of interest denial?
While each approach has strengths and limitations, the most encompassing approach
concerning the motivations and strategies of status-seeking behaviour would require a synthesis of
the social psychological and status immobility approaches. The social psychological approach
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possesses more strategies (3) for status improvement than the rationalist and constructivist
approaches combined.112 However, it faces difficulty when explaining state behaviour that appears
to reject the order because the strategies of emulation, creativity, and competition occur within the
existing order. Ward understands status immobility as an extension of the social psychological
approach, offering a strategy – the logic of rejection – for actors to use when they face unjust
obstructed status ambitions within the order, leading them to adopt revisionist foreign policies to
gain status outside the order, on occasion constituting a new order.
It must be stated that Ward’s status immobility is focused on explaining the most extreme
cases of revisionism, including Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, in which such states attempted
to destroy and rebuild the international order in their favour.113 As a result, Ward's approach is less
useful at explaining the status-seeking behaviour of states that may be dissatisfied but perceive the
order to be legitimate. However, this issue is addressed by combining the social psychological and
status immobility approaches, as the former deals with the status-seeking behaviour of states that
do not seek major revisions to the international order. Therefore, by combining the status
immobility and social psychological approaches, states would have four strategies – emulation,
competition, creativity, and rejection – to pursue status both within and outside the international
order, encompassing all locations in which status-seeking occurs.
Another benefit of merging the social-psychological and status immobility approaches is
that the synthesized approach would be the most opportunistic about conflict avoidance. From the
social psychological approach, states can utilize emulation or creativity and thus do not have to
resort to competition to improve their status. As Wohlforth et al. argue, "whether status seeking
leads to conflict or other suboptimal outcomes depends on strategic choice, with the standard
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assumption being that mobility and creativity may be conducive to system-supporting and
potentially less costly or self-defeating behaviour."114
While the status immobility approach holds that radical revisionist states will likely initiate
conflicts to improve their status, states that resort to distributive or normative revisionism can do
so without necessarily causing ‘geopolitical earthquakes’ that lead to conflict and war.115 In the
case study of China, the creation of the AIIB is an example of both normative and distributive
revisionism that has not led to conflict and war. The AIIB provides states with an alternative
normative framework to Western institutions such as the WB, and it has improved China's
influence in the global financial system. While the US might not like the influence China holds in
the AIIB, there is yet to be any conflict because of its creation. Therefore, the status immobility
approach also offers non-conflictual status-seeking strategies, even when they occur outside the
established order. Together, the synthesized approach offers strategies that occur beyond
geopolitical competition and conflict initiation, for which the rationalist and constructivist
approaches do not convincingly account.
A final point to consider concerns the perceived benefits of increased status. From the social
psychological approach, states seek status for the intrinsic benefits that high status confers,
including self-worth, positive distinctiveness, superiority, pride, and well-being. From status
immobility, instrumental benefits gained through distributive revisionism “often refers to territory
or power, but it may also mean the distribution of influence, wealth, markets, ideology, regime
type, or some other valued good.”116 States benefit from normative revisionism by being able to
set the norms, rules, and institutions of various elements of the international system. Finally, if a
state is a radical revisionist, it will benefit from both realms as it can set the distributive and
normative aspects of the entire order.
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Chapter 4: Status, Power, and Deference
4.1 Introduction
The literature broadly understands status to be inseparable from power. In fact, most status markers
are simultaneously determinants of soft or hard power.117 Unfortunately, the social psychological
and status immobility approaches do not allocate any discussion to understanding status as a form
of power. As a result, the following section will focus on the rationalist and constructivist
understandings of status as a form of soft power, specifically as an influence multiplier and
legitimate social power, respectively. The final section demonstrates how the rationalists and
constructivists understand status as a mechanism through which power is translated into deference.
4.2 Status as Legitimate Power
Soft power – getting others to want what you want – is understood as a form of attraction, in
contrast to hard power – ordering others to do what you want – which is conceptualized as
coercion.118 Rationalists view status as a form of soft power by arguing that it is an influence
multiplier.119 Volgy et al. assert that powerful states seek status to reduce the costs of being a major
power. In other words, "attribution of major power status by the community of states to a handful
of others provides members of the club with a form of soft power with which to complement
material capabilities.”120 As soft power, status reduces the costs of intervention, institutional
development, creating cooperation mechanisms, and increases the credibility of threats and
commitments. As Khong argues, the state with the most status in a particular hierarchy is "able to
translate its power into the political outcomes it desires with minimal resistance and maximal
flexibility.”
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increased status for more than its symbolic value, because status reduces the costs of pursuing vital
regional and global issues.122
While Volgy et al.s. work within the rationalist framework focuses on great powers, is it
possible to extend the 'status as an influence multiplier' argument beyond major powers? Nayar &
Paul argue that although middle, regional, or small powers might not possess the necessary
capabilities to control international outcomes, they do possess the capabilities to influence their
local status communities.123 Thus, nothing intuitively prevents small, middle, or regional powers
from pursuing status with the expectation that it will bring greater influence within their relevant
reference group.
For Murray, recognitive practices are intended to gain recognition from the established
powers. Thus, great power voice, exemplary military power, and spheres of influence are
understood as mechanisms of soft power as their intended use is to attract other states into
recognizing the status that is perceived to accompany such practices. As Barkin argues, “measures
of material capabilities can be relevant to specific political contexts, but those contexts are
themselves contingent on ideas about what kind of power can and should be used, how it is to be
used, and for what ends.”124 Murray states that "by thinking of material capabilities as 'materialized
understandings,' we may find it possible to shed new light on the role that particular forms of
weaponry – from nuclear weapons to aircraft carriers to drones – [play] in affecting interstate
behaviour."125 In other words, while nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers, and drones are traditionally
understood as coercive resources, they can be understood as symbolic attributes of high-status
states under the constructivist approach.
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If a state gains or possesses high status, its possession of status markers is not perceived as
a threat but as a legitimate part of its identity. According to Murray, “recognition legitimates its
power and, as a consequence, going forward the rising power’s adoption of recognitive practices
will be viewed as appropriate and for the purposes of contributing to the international order.”126
Once recognized as a high-status state possessing legitimate social power, the soft and hard power
resources relevant to the domain in which the state has achieved primacy are simultaneously
legitimized. Therefore, Murray argues that status is best understood as legitimate social power as
it confers the ability to legitimately use hard and soft power resources in ways consistent with a
state's standing.
4.4 Status, Power, and Deference
Both the rationalist and constructivist approaches understand status as a form of legitimate power.
According to Hofmann et al., legitimate power is evident when “an authority operates through
legitimacy of its position, expertise…and its ability to make others identify with it.”127 At the state
level, legitimate power can only be derived from a state's recognized position in formal or informal
hierarchies.128 Since status is fundamentally a state's standing, rank, or membership in groups or
clubs, achieving high status is equivalent to the 'position' requirement of legitimate power. States
who achieve high status on a particular marker also possess the necessary expertise to fulfill their
role successfully because a state cannot hold high status unless it demonstrates primacy on one or
more status markers. Legitimate power also requires identification, which is defined as the
recognition of the authority's position.129 Similarly, status is inherently social and requires
recognition from the relevant status community. Finally, at the normative level, legitimacy is
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understood as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable,
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions."130 Nicaragua cannot legitimately lead international security initiatives, and China
could not legitimately lead a global human rights initiative because they do not possess the position,
expertise, communal identification, or normative compliance necessary to hold status – and thus
legitimate power - over these domains.
Since deference is understood to be voluntary subordination to a superior actor based either
simply on their superior position or because they are perceived as the most prototypical of the status
community,131 a state can only be deferred to if the status community perceives it to be legitimate.
Tyler et al.'s research demonstrates that "when authorities are viewed as more legitimate, their rules
and decisions are more likely to be accepted."132 If status is a form of legitimate power, states
expect increased deference when they pursue improved status, as their position is supposedly
viewed as increasingly legitimate. Status thus leads to deference due to the legitimacy of position
that possessing high status confers. As Renshon argues, status clarifies who in a specific
relationship is expected to defer.133 For Murray, the role of status is to legitimize a state’s power
and produce relationships of respect and deference.134 Therefore, the rational instrumental and
constructivist approaches best understand status as a form of soft power that generates voluntary
deference through the legitimacy that high status confers.
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Chapter 5: Scope Conditions and Generalizability
5.1 Introduction
One of the most common issues raised with the status literature concerns the approaches scope
conditions.135 While Larson & Shevchenko and Renshon do not exclusively limit the scope of the
social psychological and rational instrumental approaches, they focus entirely on the status-seeking
behaviours of rising great powers. On the other hand, Murray and Ward explicitly limit the scope
of the constructivist and status immobility approaches to dissatisfied rising powers because such
states are most likely to adopt revisionist policies in international politics.136 This chapter proceeds
by offering four unique case studies to demonstrate that the scope conditions for all four approaches
can be expanded to varying degrees beyond a narrow focus on great and rising powers.
5.2 The Social Psychology Approach: Norway as a Good Power
Analyzed through the social psychological approach, Norway's most frequent status-seeking
strategy has been creativity, by defining new ways through which it can be useful for the great
powers and systems maintenance.137 The hallmark of Norway's foreign policy since the end of the
Cold War is its involvement in international peace, security, and humanitarian intervention –
domains typically under the purview of great powers. As a result, Norway is consistently referred
to as a state that 'performs,' 'dresses,' or 'acts as a great power' in ways that are not typically expected
of small states.138 Norway’s signature ‘policy of involvement’ refers to the belief that “small states
could play a ‘moral’ role which greater powers – especially the US – could not, due to the complex
web of their global interests.”139 Schia & Ole argue that because Norway does not have the same
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level of identifiable interests or stakes as more powerful states in systems maintenance, they are
committed to upholding and furthering the rules established in the UN and other multilateral
settings.140 This strategy is rooted in creativity by establishing a status dimension of 'goodness' or
'moral authority.' As a result, Norway is attempting to be seen as more reliable, 'moral,' 'good,' and
'humanitarian' than other small and middle power states.141
During the 1990s, Norway's hosting of the Oslo Process was a significant boost towards its
status as a good power. As de Carvalho & Lie state, "when former foreign minister Johan Jorgen
Holst shook hands with Clinton, Arafat, and Rabin on the White House lawn in 1993, Norway's
policy of involvement had made it a good power – one of the better ones, in fact."142 Norway's
status as a good power was also enhanced through its notable contributions to smaller but highly
visible projects such as UN Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations policy of 'Integrated Missions,' within which Norway’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Norwegian NGOs, and research institutions held prominent leadership
positions.
Perhaps the most important recognition of Norway's status came from President Obama in
2011, praising Norway's contribution to the humanitarian mission in Libya by stating, "I've said
this before but I want to repeat, Norway punches above its weight."143 In general, Wohlforth et al.
argue that “Norwegian diplomats have assiduously carved out roles for Norway as facilitator,
interlocutor, and global institution-supporter…a seemingly anomalous role for a middle power in
the far northwest of Europe.”144 Therefore, through a strategy of creativity, Norway has achieved
entry into clubs typically reserved for powerful states by promoting itself as a state that ‘throws
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good punches above its weight.’145 Perhaps most importantly, however, Norway has been able to
gain impressive status relative to its size without the need to resort to conflict, geopolitical
competition, or revisionism, demonstrating that the ‘power of ideas’ can be more effective than
coercion when improved status is the objective.
5.3 The Rationalist Approach: The United States’ Performative War in Iraq
Even though the US remained materially hegemonic after 9/11, its status was fundamentally called
into question because a few men, armed with boxcutters and without any state power or technology,
were able to destroy symbols of American capitalism and power.146 Motivated by humiliation and
the perceived need to reassert its hegemonic status and generalized deterrence, the Bush
Administration needed a ‘performative war’ that would re-establish its credibility and
reputation.147Although the US was at war with Afghanistan, central figures in the Bush
administration perceived it to be inadequate for the goal of reasserting its status. On the night of
9/11, Donald Rumsfeld privately stated that “we need to bomb something else [other than
Afghanistan] to prove that we’re, you know, big and strong and not going to be pushed around by
these kinds of attacks.”148 Similarly, Douglas J. Feith wrote in a memo to Rumsfeld on September
18th, 2001, that “single pronged attacks against the smallest state sponsor of the terrorist network
may not be sufficient...such a limited attack may be perceived as a sign of weakness rather than
strength.”149
If not in Afghanistan, where would this war of hegemonic reassertion occur? According to
Butt, “Iraq fit the bill…because it represented a festering symbolic wound to American pride…with
reminders that said ‘I’m still here,’ an untenable position in a post-9/11 world where the U.S. had
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to clearly enunciate its hegemony.”150 On September 13th, 2001, Rumsfeld stated that in Iraq, “we
could inflict the kind of costly damage that could cause terrorist-supporting regimes around the
world to rethink their policies.”151 In January of 2002, Robert Kagan and William Kristol “urged
military intervention in Iraq as part of America’s reassertion of global leadership,” stating that “the
failure of the United States to take risks, and to take responsibility, in the 1990s, paved the way to
September 11.”152 Paul Pillar would later write that the major purpose of the war was “the exertion
of American power as a demonstration of the US ability and willingness to use that power, thereby
increasing deference to US interests worldwide and deterring adversaries and would-be
troublemakers from opposing those interests.”153
In response to 9/11 and the potential rise of other geopolitical challengers (namely China),
the 2002 National Security Strategy asserted that the US would need to retain global military
superiority: "we must build and maintain our defences beyond any challenge…Our forces will be
strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."154 In line with Renshon’s argument that a
conflict must be dramatic, salient, and convey unambiguous information to demonstrate a state’s
rightful status, the US utilized a strategy of ‘Shock and Awe’ to deter any challengers, whether it
be terrorists, failed states, or rising powers.155 Accordingly, Rumsfeld stated that the invasion of
Iraq would be “of a force and scope and scale that has been beyond what has been seen before.”156
Therefore, rationalists hold that the Bush administration perceived a performative war in Iraq as
the most utility-maximizing option to not only reassert and demonstrate its strength and position
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as global hegemon but to signal to potential challengers that the US would remain the most
powerful state in the international system.
5.4 The Constructivist Approach: Identity in the UNSC Reform Debates
Historically, countries seeking permanent seats in the UNSC couched their claims in their
contributions to international peace and security. However, since the early 2000s, status claims
based on hard power and output legitimacy have 'lost their traction,' shifting towards inputlegitimacy and democratic values.157 As Hurd argues, “by virtue of being made in the international
public sphere, the interests that these arguments serve must be presented in reference to
generalizable values of the community.”158 Status-seeking within the UNSC was thus channelled
through this new normative framework, informing and constraining the positions that states take
on key issues in the reform debates.
Perhaps the most visible example of the shifting normative structure of the UNSC reform
debates is the discussions about the criteria for new members. Pakistan, Nigeria, and the G4 (India,
Brazil, Japan, and Germany) focus on ‘equitable geographic distribution’ to ‘reflect current
geopolitical realities.’159 Other states, such as Italy, Iceland, Singapore, and Denmark, advocate a
more prominent role for small to medium-sized states. India and Pakistan claim that developing
states should have a more significant role in the UNSC, and Nigeria combines this claim with the
need for permanent African representation. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
argues for representation of the 'main forms of civilization,' calling on cultural and political
diversity and regional representation.
Another visible area in which the normative shift is evident is in the principles that a
reformed UNSC should supposedly embody. For example, Pakistan, Brazil, the Arab League, the

157

Pouliot, “Setting Status in Stone,” 203.
Ian Hurd, "Myths of membership: the politics of legitimation in UN Security Council Reform," Global Governance 14 (2008),
200.
159
Pouliot, “Setting Status in Stone,” 204-206.
158

37
African Group, and Nigeria explicitly call for increased representation as a fundamental objective
of a reformed UNSC.160 South Korea argues that reform should enhance the transparency,
accountability, and inclusiveness of the UNSC, and the Philippines advocates adherence to
democratic practice, due process, the rule of law, fairness, justice, and equity. The Arab League,
for its part, claims that a reformed UNSC should be “more capable of reflecting the realities of our
era, as well as the interests and aspirations of all the countries and peoples of the world, including
those of over 300 million Arabs.”161 Canada, Mexico, the African Group, and the S5 advocate
accessibility, transparency, accountability, and equity principles, linking them to increased
credibility and effectiveness.162
This case study is important for three main reasons. First, it demonstrates that a normative
shift – from output legitimacy to input legitimacy – produces a shift in the understanding of power
– from hard power (military and economic contributions) to soft power (culture, political
organization, and demographic composition). Second, it highlights how the 'game of status seeking'
is both an identity affirming and identity transforming process. Finally, and related to the previous
points, Pouliot argues that “even countries that strive for a permanent seat for themselves have
come to couch their bids in democratic terms, often to the point of downplaying their unique assets
in contributing to international peace and security.”163 Renshon’s rationalist approach, which bases
status aspirations on material capabilities, would have difficulty explaining why powerful states,
who have a clear advantage in military and economic capabilities, would instead couch their claims
in the current democratic normative context.
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5.5 The Status Immobility Approach: Russia’s Status Glass Ceiling?
Although a shadow of its former self, Russia still possesses the second largest nuclear arsenal and
conventional military capabilities, the world's largest energy reserves, massive territory that
borders both Europe and Asia, a permanent seat on the UNSC, and leading roles in BRICs and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).164 In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War,
Russia’s foreign policy was oriented towards retrenchment, reassurance, and abandonment of
competition to advance its status. However, consistent US action to establish influence in Russia’s
sphere of influence, NATO and EU expansion, and the ‘color revolutions’ (Georgia in 2003,
Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005), posed direct challenges to Russia’s historical status.165
By the 2000s, Russia had realized that its status as a great power was not only being
challenged by the West but also rejected. For Krickovic, "as it is a declining power, the United
States and the West are under no pressure to address Russia’s grievances or to change the order to
accommodate Russia’s interests and status.”166 As a response to perceived status immobility,
Russia became 'desperate' to change the international order to ensure that it preserved its status and
influence in global politics. In its revised international order, Krickovic states, "Russia would like
to see the return of a great power concert system wherein the United States shares power with other
global powers. The new rules of the game would reaffirm a hard Westphalian notion of sovereignty
that precludes interference in each other's internal affairs."167 It would also include respect and noninterference in the great power's spheres of influence, which means special rights in the post-Soviet
space for Russia.
Due to Russia’s perceived status immobility, the civilizationists and other nationalists were
able to shift foreign policy towards their aims.168 According to Mazloomi et al., “as associated with
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pro-communist politicians and their sympathizers, civilizationists have permanently perceived
Russia’s distinctive character in the world via the prism of a cultural opposition between Moscow
and the Western powers…they portray Russia as culturally anti-Western, an independent unit in a
generally hostile world.”169 Throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, nationalists and civilizationists
constantly belittled Russia's moderate political and military leaders. The perceived threats to
Russia's status further discredited the moderates in Russian leadership, increasing support for
revisionist nationalists who would lead Russia into competition with the West. For Ward, this
revisionist foreign policy direction was the root cause of the 2008 Georgian and 2014 Ukrainian
crises.170
While Russia has experienced a turn to more aggressive foreign policies, it hardly holds
unlimited revisionist aims. Although Russia may be dissatisfied, it begrudgingly accepts the
legitimacy of the international order and has not adopted any radical revisionist policies to supplant
the US at the top of the global hierarchy.171 As Krickovic & Chang argue, “Russian leaders are
well aware of their country’s limited capabilities and recognize that it could never be restored to
the superpower status it enjoyed in its Soviet heyday.”172 Even Russia's early 2022 invasion of
Ukraine can be understood in terms of distributive revisionism, as its leaders believe that it is
entitled to greater influence over the post-Soviet space. However, rather than allowing Russia to
take on a more significant leadership role in its sphere of influence, the West has consistently
pushed back, compelling increasingly aggressive and violent policies to prevent further status
declines.173As a result, continued containment policies may contribute to Russia's sense of status
immobility, inspiring the belief that the only way to achieve their status ambitions is to pursue
increasingly revisionist policies.
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5.6 Discussion
While it is possible to analyze non-great or rising power states through the constructivist and status
immobility approaches, there is a significant limitation that hinders their ability to be applied to
small or middle powers in that rising or established great powers are most likely to be revisionist
states. For example, small states from Morocco and the Maldives to middle powers such as Canada
and Italy could not realistically pursue major revisionist policies because they simply do not
possess the capabilities to fundamentally alter the international order. It should be noted, however,
that such states could pursue limited redistributive or normative revisionism to, for example,
increase their regional influence or introduce new norms to international or regional institutions.
Therefore, while the constructivist and status immobility approaches can be applied beyond the
scope set by the authors to include declining powers and small and middle powers with limited
revisionist aims, it is difficult to apply the approaches beyond their stated scoped because small,
middle, and even great powers do not either possess the capabilities or motivation to engage in
substantial revisionist policies that would fundamentally alter the international order. As a result,
the constructivist and status immobility approaches should, in most cases, be applied in analyses
of revisionist states.
Elsewhere, Renshon claims that the rationalist approach can be applied beyond major
powers because the relevant status community that a state compares itself with is comprised of
similar states.174 As a result, small powers seeking improved status will not initiate conflict with
middle or great powers, but they could theoretically do so against other small powers. However,
there is currently an absence of literature that analyzes conflicts between smaller powers for status
improvement. So, while stating that the rationalist approach can be applied to smaller powers,
Renshon does not provide enough evidence to support this claim. Proponents of the rationalist
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approach must provide evidence before it can be concluded that the approach is generalizable
beyond the most powerful states in the international system.
Of the four approaches outlined in this review, the social-psychological approach is the
most generalizable because it offers the widest variety of strategies for states to pursue status.
Emulation is not only viable for smaller states such as Norway, which cannot directly compete with
more powerful states, but has also been used by powerful states such as China. While competition
might seem limited to great powers, it is also a viable strategy for small and middle powers because
such states compete with similar states in their relevant status community. For example, while
Norway has adhered chiefly to creativity, elements of competition exist in that it is competing with
similar powers (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Canada) to be the most 'moral,' 'good,' and
'humanitarian' state.175 Finally, creativity is a valuable strategy for any state because it does not
(1) rely on the possession of high material capabilities, (2) involve competition with higher-status
states, and (3) involve emulation, which is not an attractive option for many states such as China
or Russia. As evidenced in the case studies, states ranging from China to Norway have adopted
creativity to improve their status.
Juxtaposed with the other approaches, the social-psychological approach simply grants
states more agency in their pursuit of status. As a result, the scope of the social psychological
approach is much broader because it explains the status-seeking behaviour of a more significant
number of states. In other words, the social-psychological approach is the most generalizable
because it does not narrowly restrict the status-seeking options of states to conflict initiation,
geopolitical competition, and revisionism, as do the rationalist, constructivist, and status
immobility approaches.
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Chapter 6: Developing a Synthetic Explanation
6.1 Introduction
This review has demonstrated that each approach offers a compelling explanation as to why and
how states seek status in the international system and that they best operate at different levels of
state power. However, to further the literature's explanatory power and theoretical consistency,176
it is necessary to develop synthetic status-based explanations for state behaviour. This chapter
demonstrates that the most logical and plausible synthesis would be of the social psychological and
status immobility approaches due to their shared basis in Social Identity Theory.
6.2 Synthesizing the Social Psychological and Status Immobility Approaches
Gotz makes an important point in asserting that there is a lack of works published within the
literature that apply multiple approaches to one or more case studies. Most status analyses compare
their findings with geopolitical, normative, or domestic explanations without reference to other
status approaches.177 However, different status-based approaches offer diverging – and sometimes
similar – explanations for the same international event or foreign policy decision. In general, the
argument is that future works within the status framework should comparatively analyze the
different approaches in a wider variety of case studies to develop a broader understanding of their
strengths, weaknesses, and scope conditions.
To do so, Gotz convincingly argues that future work needs to adopt theory-testing process
tracing, which involves examining source material (elite deliberations, internal government reports,
diplomatic cables, and public discourse) to determine whether the causal mechanisms promoted by
each approach are present. However, when the causal mechanisms of multiple approaches are
present, "researchers need to weigh the existing evidence, through a quantitative analysis (e.g.,
counting the frequency with which policymakers refer to instrumental, social-psychological, or
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identity-based motivations [as well as obstructed status demands]), a qualitative analysis (e.g.,
identifying key diplomatic moments and critical decision-making junctures), or a combination of
both."178 For example, if Chinese leaders consistently refer to obstructed status demands as the
motivation for revisionist foreign policy in their internal reports but do not reference ontological
security or social-psychological factors, the status immobility approach would provide the best
explanation for China's status-seeking behaviour. However, if discourse of both obstructed status
demands and ontological security is referenced, it would be necessary to employ the abovementioned quantitative and/or qualitative methods to determine which approach holds more
explanatory power over the other.
Unfortunately, undertaking such a task is beyond the scope of this review. However, this
paper has demonstrated that it is possible to merge the insights from social-psychology and status
immobility into an integrated approach. Not only does it make sense to synthesize the two
approaches due to their basis in SIT, but also because each approach offers insights into areas in
which the other requires additional explanation. As stated in the third chapter, Ward views status
immobility as an extension of the social psychological approach. However, Ward expresses
concern with how the social psychological approach has applied SIT to international politics,
arguing that SIT is an individual-level theory that has been used by IR scholars such as Larson &
Shevchenko to explain the behaviour of states as unitary actors. As a result, he argues that
"reframing the question from one about variation in state behaviour to one about variation in
individual responses to perceptions of national status is a useful first step in addressing these
problems.”179 Bringing the level of analysis back to the individual minimizes the mutation of SIT
and highlights the importance of the domestic political environment in foreign policy decisionmaking, which cannot be captured by treating the state as a unitary actor. As a result, the
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synthesized approach would return to the roots of SIT, transferring the focus from "how states react
to status dissatisfaction to how individuals – with different psychological profiles, different
interests, and different positions within the national community – react to anxiety about the status
of the state with they identify."180
6.3 The Benefits of a Synthesized Approach
As argued in the third chapter, the main benefit of a synthesized approach would be that it offers
the best explanation concerning the strategies states utilize to pursue status. As stated, the
synthesized approach would possess four strategies for actors to select when pursuing improved
status (creativity, competition, emulation, and rejection). Although the focus of the synthesized
approach would be transferred from the state as a unitary actor to individuals within the state,
nothing is preventing the strategies of emulation, competition, and creativity from being adopted
by actors within the state.181 Furthermore, Ward provides a fourth logic, through which “individuals
can promote collective efforts to reject the norms, rules, and institutions that constitute and are
productive of the interstate status hierarchy as a means of expressing resentment and signalling the
illegitimacy of the status quo.”182 As a result, the synthesized approach would not only offer a
robust analysis of state behaviour when status is sought within the rules, norms, and institutions of
the existing hierarchy but also when status is pursued through rejection of what is perceived to be
an unjust and hopelessly unfair externally imposed order. Figure 2 provides a summary of the
synthesized approach's strategy selection process.
Furthermore, the rationalist and constructivist approaches do not account for the statusseeking behaviour of actors that do not neatly fit within the categories of conflict initiation or
geopolitical competition. While geopolitical competition and conflict initiation are evident within
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social competition and radical revisionism, the synthesized approach provides states with the
option to pursue strategies of emulation, creativity, and normative and/or distributive revisionism,
which do not predetermine violent outcomes. Thus, the synthesized approach benefits greatly from
not only providing actors with the most available options to pursue status but the agency to
determine whether conflict initiation or geopolitical competition is essential in the pursuit of status.
Another benefit of the synthesized approach is that it would offer the most encompassing
understanding of the benefits of improved status. As previously stated, the social-psychological
approach perceives the main benefit of improved status to be the intrinsic psychological desires
allocated once actors obtain high status, including positive distinctiveness, superiority, and
deference. For the status immobility approach, the perceived benefits of achieving high status can
be either instrumental or intrinsic. Ward states that "whether [status discourse] is purely
instrumental or reflects real beliefs is inherently difficult to determine, but also not crucial since
the appearance of talk about status indicates at the very least the presence of a discursive
environment that requires or rewards it."183 As a result, actors could pursue status for the intrinsic
psychological benefits mentioned above. On the other hand, they could pursue status for the
benefits associated with a radically, normatively, or distributionally revised order, which could be
both instrumental and intrinsic.
One of the main strengths of Ward's approach is that it focuses on the process through which
actors translate status concerns into foreign policy, which none of the other approaches – including
the social psychological approach – do convincingly. As argued earlier in this chapter, Ward's
proper understanding of SIT requires that the state be treated not as a unitary actor but as an entity
comprised of individuals who elevate status concerns to actionable foreign policy. There is nothing
inherently preventing emulation, competition, and creativity from being treated the same way
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because actors within the state could logically conclude that any one of the four strategies is the
most effective way to improve their state's status, depending, of course, on whether they face
conditions of status mobility or immobility.184 By synthesizing the status immobility and social
psychological approaches, Ward's insights into the proper application of SIT can be applied to all
four status-seeking strategies, and it would thus possess the most substantial understanding of how
status concerns at the individual level are translated into foreign policy at the state level.
Finally, the synthesized approach would possess the broadest scope conditions. As argued
in the fifth chapter, the social-psychological approach is the most generalizable of the four because
it can be applied in analyses of states of all power categorizations. It was also argued that the status
immobility approach was one of, if not the least, generalizable of the four approaches because it
focuses on rare cases of extreme revisionism, such as Interwar Germany and Imperial Japan.
However, regardless of the status immobility approach's lack of generalizability, the combined
approach would possess the broadest scope for two reasons. First, the approach would benefit
significantly from the generalizability that the social psychological approach brings to the table.
By providing states with the most agency in strategy selection, actors within small, middle, and
great powers can utilize whichever strategy will improve their status in their relevant reference
groups. Second, while the status immobility approach's generalizability may be a weakness on its
own, when combined with the social psychological approach, it offers a solution to the latter's
limitation in dealing with actors that seek status outside of the status quo order. Although such
cases are rare, their inclusion improves the synthesized approach's generalizability.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1 The Status of Status
The purpose of this review has been to comparatively analyze the four main approaches to status
to determine their strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, the review posed three research
questions that address fundamental aspects of the broader status paradigm. Before concentrating
on the research questions, the second chapter demonstrated that the four approaches converge on
multiple aspects of status, including a basic definition and understanding of status as inherently
hierarchical, as a positional and club good, based on collective beliefs, and pursued with the
expectation of deference.
The third chapter focused on the first research question: Which approach offers the most
convincing explanation for why and how states seek status? Ultimately, it was argued that a
synthesis of the social psychological and status immobility approaches would offer the most
convincing explanation as to why and how actors seek status because it would not limit status
seeking to conflict initiation and geopolitical competition as the rationalist and constructivist
approaches do. The fourth chapter asked: Which approach best theorizes status as a form of power
that translates into deference? For the rationalist and constructivist approaches, status is
understood as legitimate power because it confers legitimacy to high-status states based on their
position, expertise, and recognition. Under this understanding, status translates to deference due to
the perception that high-status states possess legitimacy, reducing the reliance on coercion to
influence favourable outcomes.
To address an important issue raised with the broader literature, the third research question
asked: Which approach is the most generalizable across all forms of state-power categorization?
While all four approaches can be applied beyond the authors' stated scopes, as evidenced by the
case studies in the fifth chapter, it was ultimately argued that the social psychological approach is
the most generalizable across all state-power categorizations because it offers small, middle, and
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great powers the most options to pursue status, which does not narrowly restrict their options to
initiating conflict, geopolitical conflict, or revisionism as the constructivist, rationalist and status
immobility approaches do.
Chapter six argued that the best approach to understanding state behaviour through the
status paradigm would be a synthesis of the social psychological and status immobility approaches.
Such a synthesis would require that the focus on states as unitary actors be transferred to individuals
who identify with the state so that it would be in line with the theoretical basis of SIT.185 The
synthesized approach would significantly benefit from its generalizability, relying the least on
conflict as a means of improving status, possessing the widest variety of strategies for states to
pursue status, and the most encompassing understanding of the benefits of improved status.
7.2 The Future of the Status Paradigm
While many of the approaches' strengths and limitations have been highlighted, there are still
several areas in which the status framework requires further development, including measurement,
power, determinants of status aspirations, and competitive theory testing. First, although each of
the four approaches offers a different method of measuring status concerns, levels, and/or
deficiencies, it must be noted that measuring status is inherently difficult. To begin, Renshon is the
only author who applies quantitative measures through diplomatic representation and 'sending state
importance' to measure a particular state's status rank among relevant status communities.
However, being the most connected state in diplomatic networks is not equivalent to status but is
arguably the result of wealth and the possession of other material capabilities, where wealthier
states can afford to send more diplomats while simultaneously attracting more diplomats. It is also
possible that the decision of one state to send diplomats to another is the result of interests or
ideology – thus reflecting choice, not deference – and in some cases, even coercion.186 Therefore,
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if material capabilities and interests cannot be accounted for through diplomatic recognition, it is
difficult to determine whether status drives recognition.
Alternatively, the social-psychological, constructivist, and status immobility approaches
rely upon qualitative measurements of status, which seek to discover status ex-post through the
discourse and actions of policymakers and elites. However, a significant issue with using
qualitative measures to gauge status is that leaders and elites rarely use the term 'status' as the
approaches conceptualize it. Instead, leaders may utilize terms that seem to evoke status – honour,
prestige, greatness, and superiority – but have little to do with status as a positional or club good.187
Furthermore, such discourse can be used for domestic strategy by conveying strong emotions such
as pride to garner domestic support, which has little to do with improvements to a state’s relative
position within international hierarchies.
The most significant issue with existing measurements concerns measuring deference, as
most of the analysis provided by the approaches focuses on the pursuit of status, not deference to
it. As MacDonald & Parent argue, “we need to see evidence that other states at least recognize and
likely defer to those at the top of the totem pole. The problem here is that states align their policies
with the preferences of the powerful for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with status,”188
including security, trade, or other instrumental interests. While the literature successfully
demonstrates that states such as China, Russia, Japan, Germany, and the US have engaged in
multiple bouts of status-seeking, they provide little evidence that the pursuit of status leads to
deference. Perhaps this is because there is not yet a way to measure status ex-ante and ex-post,
complicated even further by the difficulty of disentangling power-based status improvements from
status seeking-based status improvements. If we find that lower-status states do not defer to higherstatus states (the purported main benefit of status-seeking behaviour), then the pursuit of status is
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chimera. Future work should focus not only on developing more robust methods of measuring
status but on capturing deference to high-status states.
Second, while all four approaches agree that deference is an important benefit of statusseeking, the social psychological and status immobility approaches do not discuss the relationship
between status and power nor explain how increased status translates to deference. Furthermore,
although the constructivist and rational instrumental approaches provide a plausible explanation of
how status is a form of legitimate power that translates into deference through the legitimacy that
high-status accords, they provide very little evidence of cases in which status irrefutably led to
increased deference from lower-status states. As a result, the literature needs to strengthen its
understanding of the relationship between status, power, and deference by (1) developing a clearer
understanding of status as a form of power, (2) theorizing how status as a form of power translates
into deference, and (3) providing evidence to support the argument that status does lead to increased
deference.
Third, the approaches tend to focus either entirely on material or intrinsic structures,
processes, and benefits as the major determinants of a state’s status aspirations. However, the
broader literature provides ample evidence that status ambitions are co-determined by both material
and intrinsic factors.189 Perhaps the best explanation for diverging status-seeking strategies is that
material factors set the constraints from within which states operate, but how exactly they operate
within these constraints is determined by the historical, cultural, and identity-based narratives
developed by the state and prominent actors. Future work would benefit significantly from a
developed understanding of the motivations behind status ambitions. A refined explanation would
account for intrinsic and material factors while addressing the divergence in strategies adopted by
states with different material capabilities, identities, cultures, and histories.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, future work should focus on determining which
approach holds the most explanatory power and on demonstrating how the insights from one
approach can be integrated into another, with the end goal of developing a more refined, integrative
account of status-seeking behaviour in the international system. As the sixth chapter demonstrated,
it is possible to synthesize the social psychological and status immobility approaches due to their
shared basis in SIT. It should be stated that the purpose of synthesizing is not to create a unified
status approach, as this would result in a loss of theoretical diversity. Furthermore, the approaches
are – except for social-psychology and status immobility – based on different ontological
assumptions, limiting the possibility of merging various approaches in the first place. As a result,
aside from the synthesis presented in this review, future work should only combine various
perspectives when it aids in the explanation of a particular case study. For example, Renshon’s
focus on conflict initiation as a result status dissatisfaction might contribute important insights into
how states enter conflict through social competition or how securitization leads to war after failed
adoption of recognitive practices. Therefore, future work should give credence to developing
integrated status-based explanations for state behaviour only when it is needed to provide a stronger
understanding of specific events and cases.
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Appendix A
Figure 1. Overview of Approaches
Approach
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Russia (1990-2000, mid 2000present), China (1990s-present),
Norway (1970s-present), North Korea
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US (2001-2010), China (2000present), post-Cold War Russia
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destabilizing
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UNSC (1990s-2010), North Korea
(1990s-present), China (1990spresent), post-Cold War Russia
Wilhelmine Germany, Interwar
Germany, Imperial Japan

Figure 2. Synthesized Approach
Strategy

Description

Issue

Solution

Examples

Emulation

Seek entry into elite
clubs by emulating its
norms and institutions.

Recognition by relevant status
community of reformed
hierarchy.

Competition

Seek higher status
through geopolitical
competition on markers
dominant states appear
to have achieved
primacy over.
Seek higher status by
introducing new and
changing previous
understandings of status
markers.
Seeks to protest,
overthrow, or
delegitimize the norms,
institutions, and rules of
the current order.

Competition and
Creativity are not
necessarily viable, but the
hierarchy is perceived as
legitimate and permeable.
Hierarchy is perceived as
impermeable and
illegitimate, rendering
emulation ineffective.
Emulation is perceived as
undesirable.
Hierarchy is perceived as
impermeable yet
legitimate and
competition or emulation
are not necessarily viable.
Hierarchy perceived as
unfair, unjust, and
obstructive of a state’s
status ambitions.

Post-WW2 Germany
and Japan, Soviet
Union (1920s), PostCold War Russia,
UNSC (1990s-2010)
Russia (late 1990s2000, mid 2000spresent), late 1890s
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2010s-present), North
Korea (1990s-present)
Norway (1970spresent) China
(1990s-present), ColdWar India, UNSC
(1990s-2010)
Wilhelmine Germany,
Imperial Japan,
Interwar Germany

Creativity

Rejection

Recognition by relevant status
community of reformed
hierarchy.

Recognition by relevant status
community of the legitimacy of
new criteria for status.
Minor revisionism (distributive
or normative) to radical
revisionism (overthrown,
protested, or delegitimized
order) to remove obstructions.

